Mixed oligopoly, vertical product differentiation and fixed quality-dependent costs by Stefan Lutz & Mario Pezzino




WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 




MIXED OLIGOPOLY, VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND 
































A private and a public firm face fixed quality-dependent costs of production 
and compete first in quality and then either in prices or in quantities. In the 
long run the public firm targets welfare maximization whereas the private firm 
maximizes profits. In the short run both firms compete in prices or quantities 
to maximize profits. 
Mixed competition is always socially  desirable compared to a private 
duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the 
equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, mixed competition seems to be a 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the term “mixed oligopolies” the literature refers to competition among 
firms that have different objective functions
1. Examples of mixed oligopolies 
are offered by sectors such as telecommunications, postal services, banking, 
education, health care. 
Competition between private and public firms has been the objective of 
study of various previous contributions. These include studies that considered 
homogenous product mixed oligopolies
2 as well as models of mixed oligopoly 
with product differentiation
3.  
Grilo (1994) is, to our knowledge, the first work that studied duopolistic 
mixed competition when products are vertically differentiated and firms 
choose non-cooperatively first qualities and then prices. Under the 
assumptions of fully covered markets and variable quality-dependent costs, 
using the Mussa and Rosen (1978)’s utility function, the author shows that the 
presence of a public welfare maximizing firm can lead to the social optimum
4 
(described in terms of qualities and market share distribution). The assumption 
of covered market and inelastic demand produces the result that the public 
firm does not need to deal with any distortion associated with non-optimal 
consumption due to firms’ market power and consequently the mixed duopoly 
can be socially optimal.  
Delbono et al. (1996), using a model similar to Grilo (1994), introduce the 
possibility that the market might be uncovered (implying that a mixed duopoly 
can not reach the social optimum). The authors show that there exist two 
equally plausible equilibria in which either firm can be the high quality 
provider
5. In addition they show that in equilibrium both firms always price 
above marginal costs. In fact, any time the private competitor prices above 
marginal costs, the public firm would choose a price higher than marginal cost 
in order to avoid to serve too many (from a social point of view) consumers. 
Finally, it is shown that the presence of the public firm in the market decreases 
quality differences and increases market coverage and welfare. 
                                                 
1 In general the literature assumes that public firms target social welfare maximization. See 
Anderson et al. (1997) for a defence of this assumption. 
2 A common feature of these contributions is that firms are assumed to compete in quantities 
and that it is always socially optimal to nationalize all firms in the market. See Merrill and 
Schneider (1966), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Cremer et al. (1989). 
3 Cremer et al. (1991) study price competition in a market represented by a Hotelling (1929) 
line in which private and public firms choose first locations and then prices. 
4 As pointed out in Delbono et al. (1996)), the result reported in Grilo (1994) should not be 
particularly s urprising: as shown in Cremer and Thisse (1991) a model of pure vertical 
differentiation with covered market and variable quality-dependent costs where firms select 
first qualities and then prices corresponds to a Hotelling (1979) model in which firms choose 
first locations and then prices. In other words, Grilo (1994) produces a result already described 
in Cremer et al. (1991). 
5 They also show that if the public firm had a Stackelberg advantage on quality selection, it 
would provide the high quality in equilibrium.   3 
Another example of mixed oligopoly with vertical differentiation and 
uncovered markets is provided by Jofre-Bonnet (2000). The author uses Motta 
(1994)’s rendition of the model in Sutton (1991), with fixed quality-dependent 
costs. With in mind competition among health care providers
6, it is assumed 
that a public provider would aim patients’ surplus under the constraint of 
universal coverage, a budget constraint and breakeven of the private providers’ 
profits. The author shows that mixed oligopoly may be the least expensive and 
the most satisfactory scenario for patients when compared to pure private 
provision and a public monopoly. 
The objective of our model is to study the social desirability of a mixed 
duopoly with vertical product differentiation in a model à la Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) when firms face fixed quality-dependent costs and the market is 
uncovered. The assumption that quality-dependent costs are fixed implies that 
quality is enhanced mainly by investments in R&D (rather than the selection 
or better raw materials or more skilled labour). Such an assumption implies 
that for a given pair of qualities a welfare maximizing firm competing in the 
short run in prices (or in quantities) with a profit maximizing rival would try to 
leave the whole market to be served by the high quality provider (regardless its 
ownership). Intuitively, since quality costs do not increase with the volume of 
consumers served, a welfare maximizing firm prefers all consumers to buy the 
high quality. 
In the model described in this paper we consider an alternative possibility: in 
the long run the public firm selects quality in order to maximize social 
welfare, but in the short run the same firm chooses prices (or quantities) to 
maximize profits. Such an assumption allows us to study a more interesting 
scenario in which the market is served by both firms in equilibrium and some 
consumers (those with a low willingness to pay for quality) would not buy any 
good. The type of public firm we are going to consider can describe rather 
realistically the behaviour of a state-owned firm that has the statutory mission 
to maximize welfare (for example through quality provision), but in the short 
run is managed by independent profit maximizing agents
7. A public hospital in 
which quality selection (mostly in the hands of medical staff) follows welfare 
maximization, while price (or quantity) decisions are in the hands of profit-
oriented managers could be an example of the public firm we are going to 
describe in this paper.
8  
                                                 
6 Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) is another example of mixed duopoly in which hospitals 
choose qualities (facing fixed quality-dependent costs) and prices (under different 
reimbursement systems). The model is however an extension of a Hotelling (1979) model in 
which all patients have the same willingness to pay for quality. 
7 The analysis of principal-agent issues or the firm internal bargaining are out of the scope of 
this paper. 
8 Empirical contributions on hospital competition, for example, show that the short run 
competitive behaviour of non-profit and public hospitals does not differ significantly from the 
behaviour of the profit maximizing rivals. See Pauly (1987), Dranove et al. (1986), Becker 
and Sloan (1985), Sloan (2000).   4 
The paper shows that social welfare is always higher under mixed duopoly, 
regardless the type of short run competition and the ranking of equilibrium 
qualities.
9 In addition, when the public firm is the low quality provider in 
equilibrium, it selects a level of quality that coincides with an endogenous 
minimum quality standard
10. As shown in previous contributions in the 
literature, the introduction of an exogenous minimum quality standard (i.e. a 
standard that introduces a binding constraint on the lower quality in the 
market) in a private duopoly with product differentiation and fixed quality-
dependent costs is desirable
11 under Bertrand competition, but harmful if firms 
compete in quantities
12 in the short run (restricting the feasible quality space, 
the introduction of a standard has a negative effect on both firms’ profits that 
more than offsets the increase in consumer surplus). The policy implication of 
this result is that mixed competition can be a more efficient regulatory 
instrument when compared with the introduction of a minimum quality 
standard when firms compete in quantities
13 in the short run. As we are going 
to show in this paper, under Cournot competition the presence of a public 
provider  decreases the equilibrium low quality (regardless which firm 
provides it); in other words, the presence of a public firm produces an opposite 
result (and therefore socially desirable) compared with a minimum quality 
standard.  
Another interesting result is that welfare is always higher when in 
equilibrium the public firm provides the higher quality. The result seems to 
suggest that (at least in those markets in which firms require quality 
certification to be recognized as high quality providers) the regulation of a 
private duopoly would be more efficient if implemented through the 
introduction of instruments that increase the high quality rather than through 
minimum quality standards. 
The specific effects of the presence of a public provider and the social 
desirability of partial privatization depend however on the type of short run 
competition and the ranking of equilibrium qualities. The model, indeed, 
produces two possible equilibria (whether the public firm is the high or low 
quality provider). Similarly to the result in Delbono et al. (1996), both firms 
would prefer to be the high quality provider and therefore both equilibria are 
equally plausible. In addition, only when the public firm serves the low quality 
segment of the market under Cournot competition, numerical simulations 
                                                 
9 This result is also supported by empirical research, e.g. for the transport industry. While 
mixed competition does not recover the socially optimal solution, the presence of a public firm 
is a useful measure to get closer to the social optimum. See, e.g., Campos and Cantos Sanchez 
(2004) and Cantos Sachez and Moner-Colonques (2006). 
10 See Ecchia and Lambertini (1997). 
11 See Ronnen (1991). 
12 See Valletti (2000).  
13 Under Cournot competition an exogenous quality standard would decrease welfare and an 
endogenous quality standard would simply be ineffective since the quality constraint would 
not be binding.   5 
show that partial privatization could be socially desirable; otherwise, full 
nationalization of the public firm is the most efficient solution. 
In order to concentrate on a clearer derivation of the main results presented 
in this paper, the chosen modelling abstracts from some important factors such 
as asymmetric information as well as rent-seeking activities by individual 
agents and groups within public and/or private firms. Addressing these 
important issues is left for further research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the 
equilibria of the private duopoly under Bertrand and under Cournot short run 
competition. Section 3 describes the mixed duopoly under Bertrand and under 
Cournot short run competition, distinguishing and comparing the cases in 
which the public firm is the high or low quality provider in equilibrium. 
Section 4 compares the equilibria under private and mixed competition and 




2. The private duopoly 
 
Two identical firms simultaneously compete in qualities in stage one and in 
prices (or quantities) in stage two. Costs are fixed (quadratic and identical for 
the two firms) and quality-dependent.  
 We look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria by the method of backward 
induction. Specifically, the model presents the following assumptions: 
-  Two identical firms sell the same good, differentiated only by 
quality; let  i s + ˛￿ ,  i q + ˛￿  and  i p + ˛￿  represent respectively the 
quality, the quantity and the price offered by firm i, where  1,2 i = .  
-  Let us suppose that firm 1 is a private firm whereas firm 2 is a 
state-owned firm. In stage two each firm’s problem is to maximize its 
own profit function:  (,) iiiiii qspqF P=- , i=1,2. The quality-dependent 
cost functions are given by:  ( )
2
/2 ii Fs = . In stage one, instead, the 
public firm selects quality in order to maximize social welfare; firm 1 
maximizes profits again. 
-  A unit mass of consumers are in the market; each consumer 
wants to buy at most one unit of the good; consumers differ only on 
their willingness to pay for quality, represented by the parameter 
[ ] 0,1 t˛ , uniformly distributed on its support with density equal to one. 
-  The surplus of consumer k, with value of quality  k t , who buys 
one unit of the good produced by firm  i at price  i p  and quality  i s  is 
given by: 
i
kkii Utsp =- . 
   6 
Motta (1993) describes private duopolistic competition with vertically 
differentiated goods and uncovered markets under Bertrand or Cournot 
competition. Being the equilibria symmetrical, either of the two firms can be 
the low or the high quality provider. In lemma 1 firm  1,2 h =  is the high 
quality provider and firm  1,2, llh =„  is the low quality provider; moreover 







CStspdttspdt =-+- ￿￿  and  12 WCS =+P+P  represent 
respectively consumer surplus and social welfare, and  ( ) ( ) /
l hhlh tppss =--  
and  / lll tps =  are the willingness to pay for quality respectively of the 
consumer indifferent to buy from either provider a nd of the consumer 




If two identical firms face fixed quality-dependent costs and maximize profits 
selecting simultaneously and non cooperatively  
(i) first qualities and then prices, in equilibrium: 
0.2533 h s =   0.0482 l s =   0.1077 h p =   0.0102 l p =   0.5246 h q =   0.2638 l q =  
0.0244 h P=   0.0015 l P=   0.0432 CS =   0.0691 W =   0.4754 h t =   0.2116 l t = ; 
(ii) first qualities and then quantities, in equilibrium: 
0.2519 h s =   0.0902 l s =   0.1136 h p =   0.0248 l p =   0.4508 h q =   0.2747 l q =  
0.0195 h P=   0.0027 l P=   0.0402 CS =   0.0624 W =   0.5492 h t =   0.2745 l t = . 
 
Lemma 1 shows that fiercer (Bertrand) competition in the short run produces 
in equilibrium lower prices, higher coverage, higher consumer surplus and 
total welfare. Another important result is that the type of competition in which 
firms are engaged in the short run h as significant effects on their strategic 
behaviour with respect to quality. It can be shown that under Bertrand 
duopolistic competition
14 qualities are strategic complements for both firms. 
Instead, under Cournot competition
15, qualities are strategic complements for 






                                                 
14 See Ronnen (1991) and Lutz and Pezzino (2009). 
15 See for example Valletti (2000), Herguera et al. (2002), Jinji (2003) and Poyago-Theotoky 
(2003).   7 
3. Mixed duopoly 
 
Let us now consider the possibility that one of the two firms (namely firm 2) 
in stage 1 selects quality to maximize welfare. We shall consider first the case 
in which firms compete in prices in the short run. 
 
3.1. Bertrand mixed competition 
 
Under Bertrand competition in the short run, equilibrium prices
16 are given by: 
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It follows that in stage one profits and consumer surplus are given by: 
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Given that in stage one the two firms have different objective functions we 
need to distinguish the cases when the public firm is the low or high quality 
provider.  
 
3.1.1. Public firm is the low quality provider (e.g. s1=sh, s2=sl) 
 
Firms’ profits are in this case equal to  1 h P=P  and  2 l P=P  as reported in (2)
; the objective function of firm 2 is given by W . 


































  (4) 
 
and the simultaneous satisfaction gives the equilibrium qualities: 
  12 0.27790.1352 ss ==   (5) 
                                                 
16 See Motta (1993).   8 
Note that, defining  iii Rpq = , marginal revenues increase if the rival’s 
quality increases (i.e. 
2 0 iij Rss ¶¶¶>, 1,2, iji =„ ) and profit functions are 
concave (i.e. 
22 0 ii s ¶P¶<,  1,2 i = ). In addition,
22 0 i CSs ¶¶>,  1,2 i =  
2
12 0 CSss ¶¶¶>, 
22
12 0 Rs ¶¶< and 
22
2 0 Ws ¶¶<. It can be shown that no 
firm has the incentive to leapfrog the rival (notice in addition the objective 
function of the public firm does not depend on the ranking of the qualities 
provided). 
The slope of the quality best response functions of the two firms are given 







































  (7) 
 
It can be shown that the numerator and the denominator of expression (7) are 
respectively positive and negative, implying that the slope of the quality best 
response functions of both firms is positively sloped and that qualities are 
strategic complements for both firms. 
The strategic behaviour of the private firm is standard: since its marginal 
revenues increase with respect to the public firm’s quality, in order to increase 
the level of product differentiation and relax price competition, f irm 1 is 
always willing to increase its quality (and incur higher costs). The public firm 
strategically behaves in a similar way; the intuition is that an increase in the 
quality of the private firm has a positive effect both on marginal revenues and 
marginal consumer surplus, inducing the public firm to invest more in quality. 
Given the assumptions of the model and the expression in (7), we can already 
expect that the strategic behaviour of both firms would not change inverting 
the equilibrium quality ranking (i.e.  21 ss > ). 
Table 1 reports the equilibrium values of the main variables of the model 
when the public firm is the low quality provider and firms compete in prices in 
the short run. 
1 0.2779 s =   2 0.1352 s =   1 0.0812 p =   2 0.0198 p =   1 0.5692 q =   2 0.2846 q =  
1 0.0076 P=   2 0.0035 P=-   0.0724 CS =   0.0765 W =   1 0.4308 t =   2 0.1462 t =  
Table 1: mixed duopoly equilibrium when  12 ss >  under Bertrand competition   9 
The values reported in table 1 will be discussed and compared to the private 
duopoly in section 4. Notice however that in this case, even if mixed 
competition increases welfare and market coverage
17, the public firm earns 
negative profits in equilibrium. The result should not be surprising if we 
consider that when the public firm is the low quality provider under Bertrand 
competition it selects the same quality of a regulator setting a minimum 
quality standard to maximize welfare
18. Since unregulated qualities are both 
socially insufficient, a regulator can impose a standard sufficiently high to let 
both firms (given the strategic complementarity of qualities) provide higher 
qualities. However, since the regulator can affect directly only the low quality, 
the standard will push the low quality provider to incur a loss at the standard 
that maximizes welfare. 
 
3.1.2. Public firm is the high quality provider (e.g. s1=sl, s2=sh) 
 
Firms’ profits are in this case equal to  1 l P=P and  2 h P=P  as reported in (2)
; the objective function of firm 2 is again given by W . 

































  (8) 
 
and the simultaneous satisfaction of them gives the equilibrium qualities
19: 
  12 0.05250.3752 ss ==   (9) 
 
Given that the marginal revenues of both firms are increasing in the quality 
selected by the rival and that marginal consumer surplus is increasing in both 
qualities, it follows that qualities are again strategic complements as in the 
case described above in section 3.1.1. 
 
Table 2 reports the equilibrium values of the main variables of the model 
when the public firm is the high quality provider in equilibrium. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Similarly to the case described in Delbono et al. (1996). 
18 See Ronnen (1991) and Ecchia and Lambertini (1997). 
19 It can be shown again that no firm deviates from the equilibrium leapfrogging the quality 
chosen by the rival.   10 
1 0.0525 s =
 
2 0.3752 s =
 
1 0.0117 p =
 
2 0.1672 p =
 
1 0.2590 q =
 










1 0.2228 t =
 
2 0.4819 t =
 
Table 2: mixed duopoly equilibrium when  21 ss >  under Bertrand competition 
 
The degree of product differentiation increases (firms increase the provision 
of high quality and decrease the provision of low quality), consumer surplus 
decreases and a smaller number of consumers is served in equilibrium. 
However, since both firms earn higher profits, total welfare increases. 
 
3.2. Cournot mixed competition 
 
Under Cournot competition in the short run, equilibrium prices
20 are given by: 











  (10) 
 
It follows that in stage one profits and consumer surplus are given by: 
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  (12) 
 
Given that in stage one the two firms have different objective functions we 
need again to distinguish the cases when the public (welfare maximizing) firm 
is the low or high quality provider.  
 
3.2.1. Public firm is the low quality provider (e.g. s1=sh, s2=sl) 
 
Firms’ profits are equal to  1 h P=P  and  2 l P=P  as reported in (11); the 
objective function of firm 2 is given by W . 
The first order conditions for maximization of respectively  1 P  and W  are 
given by: 
                                                 
































  (13) 
 
and the simultaneous satisfaction of them gives the equilibrium qualities: 
 
  12 0.25040.0394 ss ==   (14) 
 
Profit functions are concave (i.e. 
22 0 ii s ¶P¶<,  1,2 i = ) and, in contrast to 
the case in which firms compete in prices, now marginal revenues are 
increasing in the rival’s quality only for the high quality firm (i.e. 
22
112212 0,0 RssRss ¶¶¶>¶¶¶<). This implies that firm 2’s quality is still a 
strategic complement
21 for firm 1; however firm 1’s quality is now a strategic 
substitute for firm 2. Specifically, the numerator of expression  (7) is now 
negative. Being Cournot competition less fierce than  price competition, the 
literature
22 has already pointed out that the rival’s quality is a strategic 
substitute for the (private) low quality firm since its marginal revenues 
decrease if the high quality increases. This will be the explanation of the 
strategic quality behaviour of the private firm described in the next subsection. 
Interestingly, the fact that firms compete in quantities in the short run modifies 
the strategic quality behaviour of the low quality firm, if public. It follows that 
in the equilibrium in which the public firm is the low quality provider the 
slope of both firms’ reaction function is negative. 
The public firm takes into consideration the negative effect of an increase in 
high quality on the low quality firm’s marginal revenues. In addition, the 
effect on marginal consumer surplus (still increasing in both qualities) is not 
sufficiently high to justify a strategic increase in quality.  
Table 3 reports the equilibrium values of the main variables of the model 
when the public firm is the low quality provider. 
 
1 0.2504 s =   2 0.0394 s =   1 0.1201 p =   2 0.0103 p =   1 0.4795 q =   2 0.2602 q =  
1 0.0262 P=   2 0.0019 P=   0.0350 CS =   0.0632 W =   1 0.5205 t =   2 0.2602 t =  
Table 3: mixed duopoly equilibrium when  12 ss >  under Cournot competition 
                                                 
21 The expressions of the slope of the quality best response functions are given again by (6) 
and (7). 
22 See Jingi (2002), Valletti (2000).   12 
The similarity between the behaviour of a public firm and the adoption of a 
minimum quality standard described in section 3.1.1 can not be found now 
that firms compete in the short run in quantities. As shown by Valletti (2000) 
in a similar setting
23 the adoption of a binding minimum quality standard has a 
negative effect on the profits of both firms that more than offsets the increase 
in consumer surplus (due to the increase in the provision of qualities). If the 
low quality firm is nationalized, instead, it would choose a quality lower than 
the one that would be chosen by an unregulated private firm, allowing both 
firms to earn higher profits and increasing social welfare
24. In this sense, 
nationalization of one firm might be socially preferable (compared with an 
exogenous quality standard) and more effective (compared with an 
endogenous quality standard) than other forms of quality regulation. 
If compared to the mixed duopolistic equilibrium shown in section 3.1.1, 
short run Cournot competition produces lower qualities, less coverage, lower 
consumer surplus and social optimum. 
 
3.2.2. Public firm is the high quality provider (e.g. s1=sl, s2=sh) 
 
Firms’ profits are in this case equal to  1 l P=P and  2 h P=P  as reported in 
(11); the objective function of firm 2 is again given by W . 

































  (15) 
 
and the simultaneous satisfaction of them gives the equilibrium qualities
25: 
  12 0.07700.3738 ss ==   (16) 
 
As we said in the previous section, if the private firm is the low quality 
provider its marginal revenues decrease with respect to  2 s ; consequently, it 
treats the quality of the public firm as a strategic substitute ( 12 /0 dsds < ). In 
addition, the quality of the private firm is a strategic substitute (at least locally) 
for the public firm as well ( 21 /0 dsds < ). 
                                                 
23 Pezzino (2006) shows that a minimum quality standard would be harmful also when a third 
firm enters the market. 
24 Note however that consumers would be worse off due to the presence of a low quality 
public provider. 
25 It can be shown again that no firm deviates from the equilibrium leapfrogging the quality of 
the rival.   13 
Table 4 reports the equilibrium values of the main variables of the model 
when the public firm is the high quality provider in equilibrium. 
 
1 0.0770 s =   2 0.3738 s =   1 0.0203 p =   2 0.1768 p =   1 0.2636 q =   2 0.4728 q =  
1 0.0024 P=   2 0.0137 P=   0.0541 CS =   0.0702 W =   1 0.2636 t =   2 0.5272 t =  
Table 4: mixed duopoly equilibrium when  21 ss >  under Cournot competition 
 
If compared to the mixed duopolistic equilibrium shown in section 3.1.2, 
short run Cournot competition increases the high quality and decreases the low 
quality; in addition i t produces less coverage, lower consumer surplus and 
social optimum. 
 
4. Comparisons  
 
Table 5 reports the equilibrium values of the main variables of the model 
under private/mixed duopoly under Bertrand or Cournot competition. 
Propositions 1 and 2 compare the equilibria under private and mixed duopoly. 
 
Proposition 1 
If firms compete in the short run in prices, under mixed competition 
compared to private duopoly: 
i) if  12 ss > : 
  both qualities, market coverage, consumer surplus and social welfare 
are higher; profits instead are lower and in particular the public firm has a 
loss; 
ii) if  21 ss > : 
  both qualities, the low quality provider’ s profits, consumer surplus 
and welfare are higher; the profits of the high quality provider and market 
coverage are lower instead.  
   14 
  Private  Mixed 
  Bertrand  Cournot  Bertrand  Cournot 
      12 ss >   21 ss >   12 ss >   21 ss >  
1 s   0.2533  0.2519  0.2779  0.0525  0.2504  0.0770 
2 s   0.0482  0.0902  0.1352  0.3752  0.0394  0.3738 
1 p   0.1077  0.1136  0.0812  0.0117  0.1201  0.0203 
2 p   0.0102  0.0248  0.0198  0.1672  0.0103  0.1768 
1 q   0.5246  0.4508  0.5692  0.2590  0.4795  0.2636 
2 q   0.2638  0.2747  0.2846  0.5181  0.2602  0.4728 
1 P   0.0244  0.0195  0.0076  0.0017  0.0262  0.0024 
2 P   0.0015  0.0027  0.0035 -   0.0162  0.0019  0.0137 
CS   0.0432  0.0402  0.0724  0.0592  0.0350  0.0541 
W   0.0691  0.0624  0.0765  0.0771  0.0632  0.0702 
1 t   0.4754  0.5492  0.4308  0.2228  0.5205  0.2636 
2 t   0.2116  0.2745  0.1462  0.4819  0.2602  0.5272 
Table 5: equilibrium private and mixed duopoly. Under private duopoly, without loss 
of generality, it is assumed that firm 1 is the high quality provider. 
 
Proposition 2  
If firms compete in the short run in quantities, under mixed competition 
compared to private duopoly: 
i) if  12 ss > : 
  both qualities, market coverage, consumer surplus and the profits of 
the low quality provider are lower; social welfare and the profits of the high 
quality provider are instead higher; 
ii) if  21 ss > : 
  the quality selected and the number of consumers served by the high 
quality and the low quality provider are respectively higher and lower; profits 
are lower, market coverage, consumer surplus and welfare are higher.  
 
Propositions 1 and 2 convey the message that mixed competition is always 
socially desirable regardless of the type of short run competition and 
equilibrium quality ranking. 
However the way the presence of a public firm increases welfare differs in 
the various cases. Under Bertrand competition, for example, the public firm’s 
behavior increases the efficiency of the system increasing quality competition 
and, consequently, consumer surplus. Profits, however, are lower than under 
private competition; if p roviding the low quality firm 2’s profits are even 
negative (we described above the similarity between the quality selection of 
public firm and the selection of a benevolent regulator). 
If firms compete in quantities in the short run, the way welfare increases 
with the nationalization of firm 2 varies even more. If firm 2 provides the low   15 
quality in equilibrium, then welfare is increased by an increase in firm 1’s 
profits that more than offsets the decrease in consumer surplus (both qualities 
are lower under mixed competition
26) and firm 2’s profits. If, instead, firm 2 is 
the high quality provider, the high quality in equilibrium is higher than under 
private competition generating higher consumer surplus and welfare; both 
firms earn lower profits now. 
Moreover, the degree of product differentiation always increases under 
Cournot competition; under Bertrand competition product differentiation 
decreases if  12 ss > , otherwise (in contrast to the case shown in Delbono et al. 
(1996)) differentiation shows the greatest increase. 
A possibility we have not considered so far is that the public firm might be 
only partially nationalized
27. We suppose that the objective function of the 
public firm is given now by a combination of own profits and welfare. If 
[ ] 0,1 a˛ , the new objective function of the public firm can be written as: 
  ( ) 21 SaCS =P++P   (17) 
If  0 a = , then firm 2 is a profit maximizing agent and equilibria are 
described in lemma 1. If instead  1 a = , firm 2 is welfare maximizing firm and 
its behaviour has been described in propositions 1 and 2. 
The results of  numerical simulations (see appendix) describe the 
equilibrium values of qualities, profits, consumer surplus and welfare as 
functions of parameter a. Propositions 3 and 4 summarize the results. 
 
Proposition 3 
If firms choose first qualities and then prices, full nationalization (i.e.  1 a = ) 
of the public firm produces the highest welfare, highest qualities and 
consumer surplus in equilibrium. Firms’ profits decrease with a and  2 P  
becomes negative for sufficiently high a. 
 
The monotonicity with respect to a of the relevant variables considered 
implies that the same comments regarding the result in proposition 1 apply to 
proposition 3.  
 
 
                                                 
26 As argued above, the quality selection of public firm in this case can not be compared to the 
introduction of a minimum quality standard. 
27 In a homogenous product quantity competition setting Matsumura (1998) shows that it is 
always preferable to partially privatized the public firm. Other works considering the 
possibility that the public firm’s objective function is a (convex) combination of profits and 
welfare are Delbono and Scarpa (1995) and White (2002). De Donder and Roemer (2009) 
study instead the internal bargaining process inside a public firm managed by three groups of 
agents: (profit maximizing) owners, (revenue maximizing) managers and (welfare 
maximizing) government. The authors provide the results of numerical simulations that show 
that welfare may be increasing in the bargaining power of the government. 
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Proposition 4 
If firms choose first qualities and then quantities, full nationalization (i.e. 
1 a = ) of the public firm produces the highest welfare and consumer surplus in 
equilibrium only if  21 ss > ;  2 s  and  1 s  respectively increases and d ecreases; 
1 P  monotonically decreases, while  2 P  initially increases and then decreases 
with a. 
If  12 ss > , both qualities, consumer surplus and  2 P decrease with respect to 
a, while  1 P  increases. Social welfare is maximized for 01 a << . 
 
The results in proposition 4 show that when firms compete in quantities in 
the short run quality ranking plays an important role. If  21 ss >  then full 
nationalization is socially preferable (even if firms earn lower profits). If 
instead  12 ss > , partial nationalization of firm 2 would be socially desirable. In 
particular, for low values of a the high quality firm’s profits increase with a 
while  2 P  and consumer surplus decrease. It follows that initially the positive 
effect on  1 P  more than offsets the low in CS and  2 P  until a critical value of a 
(corresponding to the maximum welfare); for higher values of a the negative 




The paper analyzed mixed competition between a public (welfare maximizing) 
firm and a private (profit maximizing) rival that face fixed quality-dependent 
costs and select non-cooperatively first qualities and then prices (or 
quantities). The paper shows that the nationalization of one of the two firms is 
always socially desirable, regardless the type of short run competition and the 
quality ranking in equilibrium. 
The specific effects of the nationalization (or the social desirability of 
partial privatization of firm 2), however, depend on the degree of short run 
competition and whether the public firm is the high or low quality provider in 
equilibrium. 
We have shown that welfare is always higher when firm 2 is the high 
quality provider. In fact, in this case under Bertrand competition, both 
qualities are higher than when  12 ss > . It follows that the higher consumer 
surplus and firm 1’s profits more than balance the decrease in  2 P . 
Nationalization of firm 2 produces similar effects under Cournot competition, 
except on the profits of firm 1 that in this case decrease as well. 
The main message of the paper is that, whenever possible, nationalization of 
the low quality provider is more efficient than the introduction of a minimum 
quality standard. In addition, since welfare is always higher when the public 
firm is the high quality provider in equilibrium, it follows that policy   17 
instruments (e.g. quality certifications) that increase the unregulated high 
quality in a market served by two private firms are again socially preferable 
compared to minimum quality standards, regardless the type of competition in 
the short run. 
Nevertheless, there remain significant other problems with mixed 
competition in practice arising in part from asymmetric information as well as 
principal-agent issues. In particular, rent-seeking activities by individual 
agents and groups within public firms, but also within private firms, may lead 
to additional inefficiencies. This may also explain the mixed record in 
industries such as the health sector or public transport. Therefore the 
modelling approach chosen in our paper was geared towards first establishing 
comparative welfare results in the absence of asymmetric information and 
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Appendix 
We report the results of numerical simulations
28 reproducing equilibrium 
quality selection when the objective function of firm 2 is given by (17) and 
[ ] 0,1 a˛ . 
 
A.1. Bertrand short run competition 
A.1.1.  12 ss >  
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A.2. Cournot short run competition 
A.2.1.  12 ss >  
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